by Felix Quigley
July 5, 2008
I have in this article returned to Wikipedia to see what they say about the key trial of the Serb General Radislav Krstic. I am still searching for evidence that the Serbs killed a single Muslim to create the Srebrenica massacre of 8000 as they tell us. By the way conversations that are reported picked up by NATO do not count. NATO remember are the enemy in this contest. Nor do pieces of evidence against Krstic from the enemy Islamofascists! The reason they do not copunt is that they are partisans in the contest. Again this whole entry by Wikipedia is partisan.
[begin entry from Wikipedia on Krstic here]
UN “Safe Area” Warnings
On August 15, 1994, Krstić was appointed Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. Krstić worked with his replacement to familiarize him with his roles and function until September 1, and then worked with the former Chief of Staff whom he would be replacing to learn his new post until September 28. He was then briefed about Bosnian operations coming from the direction of Tuzla, Živinice, Kladanj, and Olovo against Serbian defense lines. His predecessor also briefed him and told him that, despite the status of the safe area accorded to Srebrenica and Žepa and the obligations stemming from agreements on demilitarization, the forces of the 28th Mountain Division of the Eastern Bosnia Corps in Srebrenica and Žepa were, in fact procuring from Tuzla and Kladanj or directly from Sarajevo more weapons in addition to the light or infantry weapons they already had.
There were numerous reports from Serb intelligence sources of the BiH Army troop movements in and out of protected enclaves carrying arms, reconnoitering Serb positions, and other military actions against Tuzla, Živinice, and Kladanj, all using UN protectorates as a base of operations in the region and operating under the radar so as to avoid notice by UNPROFOR. Krstić stayed at his post at the Corps Command until November 1, 1994, whereupon he established a brigade and took it to the area of the Herzegovinian Corps for the purpose of combatting the offensive which was being conducted by the Eastern Bosnia Corps from the area of Bjelasnica and Igman towards Treskavica and Trnovo. He remained in the area of Treskavica and Trnovo until mid-December 1994, whereupon he returned to his post as the command of the Corps in Vlasenica.
He was again briefed about the situation with operations that the Bosniak command of the 28th Division in Srebrenica, acting upon orders of the Main Staff of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, was conducting towards the positions of the Drina Corps, in particular the Milici municipality, Han Pijesak, and the Vlasenica municipality. He was also briefed about intel on the continuation of the army and weapons and ammunitions supply to the protected area to the members of the 28th Brigade. They began intercepting communications indicating an attempt by the BiH Army to conduct supply chain operations from Tuzla to link up with their forces in Srebrenica in an operation named SKAKAVAC (grasshopper).
 Landmine Injury
On December 29, 1994, while inspecting force deployment at Kladanj and Olovo, Krstić stepped on a landmine and was seriously wounded. He was taken to a military hospital in Sokolac where, on January 3rd, his right leg below his knee was amputated. He stayed in the military hospital in Meljine until the end of March 1995 when he was transferred to the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, remaining there until the end of April 1995. He was discharged from the military hospital at his request and stayed for a couple of days with his family in Kosovska Mitrovica, and then returned to Bosnia with his wife to report to his doctors in Sokolac and Vlasenica for further treatment. He underwent therapy alternately in Sokolac and Vlasenica until the middle of May 1995, when he returned to his official post.
 The Bosnian Army Offensive
Upon returning to his official duties, Krstić was again briefed that activity by Bosnian Muslim forces between Tuzla and the UN protectorates was increasing, and Serb forces were suffering heavy losses to infiltrators. Serb intelligence reported that, despite a no-fly order on much of the area, BiH military helicopters were landing in protected areas daily with munitions and supplies. Noting the buildup toward a major offensive by the BiH Army, the Drina Corps began preparations for a counter-offensive.
On June 15 1995, forces of the 2nd Corps of the BiH Army launched simultaneous offensives against the 1st Brčanska Brigade, the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Vlasenica Brigade along the Tuzla-Zvornik and Kladanj-Vlasenica axes. There were casualties suffered on both sides, but the Drina Corps made territorial gains in the Kalesija and Osmaci mucipalities, and after four days of fighting the 2nd Corps was driven back to their original positions. The Eastern Bosnia Corps then concentrated their forces on the Tuzla-Zvornik axis, however, and after establishing a bridghead on the Spreča River, they broke through Serb lines and destroyed the villages of Markovica, much of Osmaca, and the entire village of Zelena. The 28th Division of the 2nd Corps then occupied the villages of Višnjica and Rječice, and when they attacked the VRS Main Staff from the direction of Banja Lučica and Krivace. This territory was held until June 26, when the Drina Corps fortified their defenses and managed to halt and then repel the BiH Army back to their initial positions.
 Operation Krivaja 95
Believing that the UN-protected enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa were never demilitarized, and that they hid what amounted to “five or six brigades” of BiH Army troops and weapons, the VRS Main Staff ordered the Drina Corps Command to undertake an operation codenamed Krivaja 95. This was in response to a March 8 1995 directive from the Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić himself (although it is believed that Krstić was a co-planner), ordering that “The Command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations directive number 7 and 7/1 of the GS VRS, and on the basis of the situation in the Corps area of responsibility has the task of carrying out offensive activities with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone, as soon as possible, in order to split apart the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica, and to reduce them to their urban areas.” The directive went on to detail the “complete the physical separation of the Srebrenica and Žepa enclaves as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals between the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity, with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Žepa.“
The operational objective was to “By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in size the Srebrenica and Žepa enclaves” whose purpose was to “To improve the tactical position of the forces in the depth of the area and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves.” Mission parameters included a very accelerated timetable, complete radio silence, a ban on targeting UNPROFOR forces, and the operation was to be managed by several commanders, Krstić among them, from a forward command post in Pribicevac. There was also physchological components to the operation plan. The directive laid out support for combat operations by ordering that “The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the International Community and international public opinion.” It is believed that operations to this effect actually began three months before the attack in April of 1995.
Reconnaissance was carried out from the forward command post at Pribicevac, Besica Brdo, and the Bracan surface mine. Following this, the Drina Corps requested that the VRS provide the cooperation of the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment, as well as that of the 1st and 2nd Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades. A sudden flare-up of fierce resistance by the BiH Army against all VRS axes delayed the commencement of the operation by several days, and resources were concentrated on re-acquiring territory lost in these attacks.
On July 9, around 1700 hours, General Ratko Mladić, commander of the VRS Main Staff arrived without advance notice at the forward command post in Pribicevac along with other senior VRS Generals to monitor combat operations. Once commanders radioed from the battle theater that they had accomplished their given tasks, Mladić radioed back “This is Panorama 01. You haven’t accomplished your task. Continue the attack. Enter Srebrenica. I am now in command of the forces engaged in this operation.” Resistance by the Eastern Bosnia Corps’ 28th Division was finally beginning to flag, and Mladić had just effectively relegated Krstić to the role of an observer. Throughout the night and the next day, the VRS pressed forward, making gains in enough key areas to control all the needed strategic positions to take Srebrenica. It was at this point that NATO fighter pilots in F-16s began flying over combat operations.
On July 11 1995 the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, reinforced by a unit from the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, began a final push into Srebrenica from the Southeast. At 1430 the two F-16s conducted air strikes against VRS tanks, inflicting some damage during the thirty-minute attack, to which Mladić responded by ordering ground troops to take air attack defense measures, such as the burning of haystacks to create smokescreens.
The Drina Wolves from the 1st Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were the first VRS soldiers to enter the town of Srebrenica around 1600 that day. After the area was cleared and more forces arrived, Krstić and the other Generals departed the forward command post and reassembled in Srebrenica. Mladić immediately ordered the brigade commanders to press the attack onward to Potočari and Bratunac, but after logistical and other considerations raised by Krstić and Živanović, Mladić ordered troops to hold and stabilize their present lines. That night at a meeting with Mladić, Krstić was placed in charge of infantry forces that would be conducting an overnight march toward Žepa in preparation for combat operations there. At this meeting it was also decided that Živanović would oversee the procurement of buses to remove civilians from Srebrenica to Kladanj.
It is known that Krstić visited Potočari at least once, he gave a television interview there, but it is not known the extent of his involvement in the ensuing Srebrenica Massacre. It is known that the VRS separated the adult male refugees in Potočari from the others, and the latter were loaded to buses and transported to Kladanj. The former were taken in groups to isolated locations such as Čerska Valley, Kravica warehouse, Orahovac, Branjevo Farm, Petkovci Dam and Kozluk, blindfolded, and executed. The current body count stands at just over 6,000, with over two thousand more missing.
Seized VRS documents indicated that there were major logistical considerations provided for with regard to fueling of transport trucks, transporting prisoners, equipment to move earth for mass graves, as well as the assignment and provisioning of ammunition for the executions. The following coded communication was intercepted over unsecured lines between VRS Main Staff Security Chief Ljubiša Beara and Krstić in which Beara was requesting assistance with disposing of prisoners:
RK: I will see what I can do, but it will disturb a lot. Please, you have some men down there at Nastić’s and Blagojević’s.
LB: But I don’t have any, and if I did — or if I did, I wouldn’t still be asking for the third day.
RK: Check with Blagojevic, take his Red Berets.
LB: They’re not there. Only four of them are still there. They took off, fuckers. They’re not there anymore.
RK: I’ll see what I can do.
LB: Check it out and have them go to Drago’s. Krle, I don’t know what to do anymore.
RK: Ljubo, take those MUP guys from up there.
LB: No, they won’t do anything. I talked to them. There is no other solution but those 15 to 30 men with Indjić.
RK: Ljubo, you have to understand me, too. You guys have fucked me up so much.
LB: I understand, but you have to understand me, too. Had this been done then, we wouldn’t be arguing over it now.
RK: Oh, now I’ll be the one to blame.
LB: I don’t know what to do. I mean it, Krle, there are still 3500 parcels that I have to distribute and I have no solution.
RK: I’ll see what I can do.
General Krstić then allegedly undertook to arrange that men from the Bratunac Brigade assist with the Branjevo Farm and the Pilica Dom executions.
 Stupcanica 95
Over the next few days General Krstić assembled the commanders from several brigades present in the area that would be contributing some or all of their forces to the Žepa attack (now codenamed Stupcanica 95), including the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, the Birač Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, and the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment. In Viogora they assembled the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, and the Independent Skelani Battalion, marched southward, and arrived at the wider assembly area of Podravanje, Rupovo Brdo, and Bracan. They would be attacking along the line of Podravanje–Orlov Kamen, Zlovrh and on to Žepa.
On July 13 there was a flurry of preparatory measures involving scouring the terrain for remaining members of the 28th Division, organizing mine groups to detect minefields and conduct demining operations, removing obstacles on roads within the protected area as well as roads between units and the staging area for the Žepa operation. Numerous executions of bound prisoners also took place in this region. On July 19 the following conversation between Krstić and Deputy Commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade General Dragan Obrenović was intercepted:
RK: Is that you, Obrenović?
RK: Krstić here.
DO: How are you General, sir?
RK: I’m great, and you?
DO: Thanks to you I am too.
RK: Way to go, Chief. And how’s you’re health?
DO: It’s fine, thank God, it’s fine.
RK: Are you working down there?
DO: Of course we’re working.
DO: We’ve managed to catch a few more, either by gunpoint or in mines.
RK: Kill them all. God damn it.
DO: Everything, everything is going according to plan. Yes.
RK: Not a single one must be left alive.
DO: Everything is going according to plan. Everything.
RK: Way to go, Chief. The Turks are probably listening to us. Let them listen, the motherfuckers.
DO: Yeah, let them.
Despite losing some of his force in a transfer to augment operations in the Alibegovac and Kak areas, on the morning of July 17, the march on Žepa commenced, with the attack building to full swing a few days later. The attack was initially slowed down due to terrain features along the attack axes. Žepa fell to the VRS on August 1.
 Promotion To Drina Corps Commander
Generals Mladić and Tolimir joined Krstić at the forward command post in Krivaca on the day the Žepa attack began and informed him that he (Krstić) would be soon taking over duties as Corps Commander. About a week later, after the forward command post had been moved to Godjenje, Mladić ordered Krstić to travel to a restaurant near Han Pijesak to take over Živanović’s post as Corps Commander. There was a formal ceremony, after which Krstić performed some transitory duties and visited his family briefly in Kosovska Mitrovica.
In August 1995, General Krstić went to Zvornik and joined Obrenović in a review of the right flank of the 7th battalion trenches. A Srebrenica Massacre survivor was heard on a soldier’s transistor radio giving an account over the radio broadcast from Tuzla. General Krstić ordered that the radio be switched off, with the admonition that they should not listen to enemy radio. He then asked Obrenović if he had issued orders that enemy radio should not be listened to and Obrenović said that he had not. Krstić refused to discuss the executions further.
General Krstić was relieved of his duties as Corps Commander on November 21, 1995 and he was sent to the National Defense School in Belgrade. He returned to the Main Staff of the VRS in September of 1996 for further deployment, and was appointed to the post of the Chief of Inspection for Combat Readiness of the VRS. He was appointed the Commander of the 5th Corps in April 1998.
 Indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
On November 1 1998 General Radislav Krstić was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague for genocide, complicity to commit genocide, extermination, two counts of murder, and persecution. On October 27, 1999 the indictment was amended to include one count of deportation and one count of inhumane acts.
 Arrest and Trial
On Wednesday, December 2 1998, Krstić was driving through the village of Vršani on the Bijeljina-Brčko road while en route to Banja Luka on business when his car was disabled by road spikes and he was pulled through his car window and taken into custody in a joint SAS–Navy SEAL operation launched by SFOR. He was immediately transported to the Hague for trial. The Serb governments both in Banja Luka as well as Belgrade expressed outrage, and even Moscow protested the manner in which Krstić was detained, in that it took place in an area of Bosnia patrolled by the Russian SFOR contingent, which was not apprised of the operation.
Krstić’s trial began five days after his abduction on December 7, 1998. His defense strategy was one of complete denial. He did not deny that war crimes had been committed by the VRS, but he denied that he issued orders for these actions. He pled ignorance and placed the likely responsibility on General Mladić’s shoulders. He claimed that he did not participate in planning, organizing or the ordering of killing and deportation, concentrating on his attack on Žepa while the bulk of the executions were taking place. He even claimed to have known and heard nothing about any atrocities until his own trial. On August 2 2001 Krstić was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 46 years in prison.
On August 15 2001, Counsel for Radislav Krstić filed a notice of appeal against the Trial Chamber judgement, arguing that the Trial Chamber both misconstrued the legal definition of genocide and erred in applying the definition to several circumstances of the case. The Appeal’s Chamber dismissed the appeal with regard to the legal definition of genocide. With regard to factual errors, the Appeal’s Chamber on April 19, 2004 dismissed the appeal on some issues, but granted it with regard to other issues. They pronounced him not guilty of genocide, but affirmed his guilt as an aider and abbetor to genocide, thus redefining Krstić’s involvement and cutting 11 years from his sentence.
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001016it.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 16, 2000
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001017it.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 17, 2000
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001018it.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 18, 2000
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001025ed.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 25, 2000″
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/tol-ii050210e.htm “ICTY Prosecution Indictment Against Zdravko Tolimir, Radivoje Miletić and Milan Gvero”
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001025ed.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 25, 2000″
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001019it.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 19, 2000
- ^ http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=165045&apc_state=henitri2000 “Tribunal Update 182 (June 26 – July 1, 2000)”
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe60/031113IT.htm “Trial of Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić Transcript” November 13, 2003
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/glance/krstic.htm “Case Information Sheet: Krstić Case (IT-98-33)”
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001020ed.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript”, October 20, 2000
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/transe33/001101ed.htm “Trial of Radislav Krstić Transcript” November 1, 2000
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/obrenovic/trialc/facts_030520.htm “Statement of facts as set out by Dragan Obrenović”
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/krs-ii981102e.htm “Indictment Against Radislav Krstić”
- ^ http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/krs-1ai991027e.htm “Amended Indictment Against Radislav Krstić”
- ^ Interfax News Agency, December 4 1998
- ^ Radislav Krstic becomes the first person to be convicted of genocide at the ICTY and is sentenced to 46 years imprisonment
- ^ Case Information Sheet Krstić Case (IT-98-33)
 External links
-  Krstić Trial Transcripts
-  Initial ICTY Indictment
-  Amended ICTY Indictment
- TRIAL: Krstić before ICTY
Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radislav_Krsti%C4%87“
Categories: 1948 births | Living people | Military of Republika Srpska | People convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia | People indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia | Serbian soldiers | Landmine victims | Bosnian Serbs convicted of crimes against humanity | Bosnian Serbs convicted of genocide | Bosnia and Herzegovina people imprisoned abroad | Prisoners and detainees of the United Kingdom
[end of quote from Wikipedia article on Krstic]